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Markets and Morality
By Jagdish Bhagwati*
It is common knowledge that Adam Smith,
the acknowledged father of Economics as
we know it, had written The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759) before he wrote The Wealth
of Nations (1776). More sophisticated students
of Economics today would also know that Adam
Smith held the Chair in Moral Philosophy from
1752, after a year as Professor of Logic, at
Glasgow University. Therefore, that Economics
has evolved from moral philosophy, and has
affinity by birth with it and therefore is a moral
science, should not surprise anyone.
Yet, the analysis of the interaction between
Economics and moral philosophy, or perhaps
simply morality, has raised interesting issues
over time. In the following, I concentrate on a
few salient ones today.

against John Maynard Keynes, the punch
line was that Keynes held the two opinions).
Douglas A. Irwin (1989, p. 45) has recalled
how Sir Robert Peel, who repealed the Corn
Laws in 1848 to usher in unilateral free trade in
England, lamented, despite his love of “political economy” (as Economics was called then),
that Peel found only confusion and dissension
among the leading economists of the day on the
Corn Laws’ effect on wages, profits and rents:
“The very heads of Colonel Torrens’s
chapters are enough to fill with dismay
the bewildered inquirer after truth. These
are literally these—‘Erroneous views
of Adam Smith respecting the value of
Corn’, ‘Erroneous doctrine of the French
economists respecting the value of raw
produce’, ‘Errors of Mr. Ricardo and his
followers on the subject of rent’, ‘Errors
of Mr. Malthus respecting the nature of
rent’, ‘Refutation of the doctrines of Mr.
Malthus respecting the wage of labour.’”

I. Positive and Normative Analyses

First, if Economics is to advance the public
good, we must have two prior conditions satisfied:
we must have scientifically compelling “positive”
economic analysis and we must have an agreed
yardstick, what we call “normative” criteria, with
which we use that positive analysis to choose
public policy that advances the public good.
The former task has been the main reason
why Economics branched out as a separate discipline from moral philosophy whose principal
preoccupation naturally was with the latter task.
Economics has been evolving continually, of
course, in its main task of illuminating the working of the economy.
That it is essential before normative analysis
does not mean, of course, that it can unambiguously help the policymaker. Thus, recall the
famous witticism that if there are six economists,
there are seven opinions (and, when directed

The normative leg of Economics, coming
more directly from moral philosophy, has been
generally based on utilitarianism from the time
of Jeremy Bentham (1776, 1780). While this
has generally meant that economists typically
work with social utility functions whose arguments are goods and services, there have been
important qualifications. In particular, we owe
to Roy Harrod, the pioneer with Evsey Domar
of growth economics and biographer of Keynes,
the extension to “process utilitarianism,” which
says that we derive utility not merely from outcomes but also from the process by which we
reach the outcome. Thus, many find it distasteful to have a market for adopting babies even
though it may produce an efficient outcome;
and I have noted in Bhagwati (1998) that Judge
Richard Posner’s advocacy of such a market
may well cost him a seat on the Supreme Court.
Again, international economists such as Harry
Johnson, T. N. Srinivasan, and myself have
actually dealt with “noneconomic objectives,”
where we modify the utility function also to
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incorporate s elf-sufficiency and a target level of
import-competing production to figure out the
best ways to arrive at optimal policies.
I might add that to get public policy, and hence
the pursuit of the public good, right, the policymaker has to get both the positive and normative
elements right. Thus, I have argued in Bhagwati
(2007) that the philosopher Peter Singer of
Princeton University gets foreign aid policy
wrong, not because he is a utilitarian, which I
believe is a correct welfare criterion, but because
he gets his economic analysis wrong by buying
into the technocratic notion, advanced by economists such as Jeffrey Sachs who wrongly dismiss
concerns about the efficacy of aid as reactionary
and reprehensible instead of confronting them
with evidence and argumentation, that aid is
necessarily ameliorative of poverty. Good policy
has to walk on both legs, positive and normative,
and both have to be sound and strong.
II. Economics, Self-Interest, and Morality

Economics has also been handicapped by
the notion that it deals with self-interest when,
in fact, as even Adam Smith recognized in the
Theory of Moral Sentiments, man does not live
by self-interest alone. In fact, as Rabbi Hillel
remarked, “If I am not for myself, who will be?
And if I am not for others, who am I?” So, why
is Economics concentrated on self-interest as the
driver for economic analysis?
One defense has been to argue, as did
Sir Dennis Robertson of the University of
Cambridge, that Economics deals with man’s
“basest motive,” self-interest, to devise an institutional framework which would lead those
who work from self-interest to produce public
good. This is indeed how Adam Smith himself described what he had done, showing how
people producing for private profit would nonetheless be guided by the Invisible Hand of the
market to desirable outcomes.
Given the centuries-old Christian tradition
which deprecated self-interest or greed or selflove in ascending orders of moral turpitude,
this was a remarkable turnaround and would
lay the groundwork for many such as Voltaire,
most eloquently in 1734, to celebrate the working of markets as conducive to public good, as
beautifully discussed by the historian Jerry Z.
Muller (2002) in his classic work on capitalism
in Western thought.
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Indeed, Adam Smith’s paradoxical demonstration that private greed would produce public
good, under the conditions of the marketplace,
was what gave him the recognition that all paradoxes that overturn conventional wisdom will
produce. In the same way, any claim that altruism would be beneficial will sink into oblivion.
But if you demonstrate instead that “the road
to hell is paved with good intentions,” that will
give you fame!
But the notion that markets, promoted by
Adam Smith and by his demonstration of the
paradox of self-interest, would undermine
morality, was a different, if related, objection.
It has in fact proven remarkably resilient. It has
in fact been revived with gusto by opponents of
markets and mainstream Economics after the
current financial and macroeconomic crisis. The
filmmaker Oliver Stone who produced the 1987
film, Wall Street, which immortalized Gordon
Gekko as the symbol of markets and greed, has
produced a 2010 sequel, Wall Street: Money
Never Sleeps.
Interestingly, the Seven Deadly Sins, immortalized in 1933 in the Paris production of
Brecht’s ballet composed and directed by Kurt
Weill and choreographed by George Balanchine,
have never put Greed at the top of any of the
many lists compiled; but the current crisis seems
to have elevated it to the pride of place!
But is it really plausible to assert that markets
undermine morality? I have argued, in Bhagwati
(2009), that I find the notion that markets corrupt our morals, and determine our ethical destiny, to be a vulgar quasi-Marxist notion about
as plausible as the other vulgar notion that ownership of the means of production is critical to
our economic destiny. The idea that working
with and within markets fuels our pursuit of selfinterest is surely at variance with what we know
about ourselves.
Yes, markets will influence values. But, more
importantly, the values we acquire elsewhere
determine how we behave in the marketplace.
The Dutch burghers used their wealth from commerce to exercise what I call Personal Social
Responsibility: they spent the moneys they
made, not on themselves, but on good works.
The Jains of Gujerat (from whom Mahatma
Gandhi drew his inspiration) did likewise.
Again, the Belgian economist Andre Sapir has
argued that there are different forms of capitalism
in the world today, reflecting d ifferent cultures
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and values. The Scandinavians have an approach
to capitalism that differs from that in the United
States, for example: the former is more egalitarian
in outcomes whereas the latter is more focused on
ensuring equal opportunity. So, where do we get
our values and how do we confront the phenomenon of Bernard Madoff and others? I have argued
in Bhagwati (2008, 2009) that:

Again, it is interesting to observe that John
Stuart Mill (1848) argued for a favorable moral
impact from markets via the freeing of international commerce (which, in fact, was also
central to the evolution of Economics since antimercantilism was at the heart of The Wealth of
Nations, and indeed to John Locke’s earlier writings). Thus witness his forthright argument:

“[Our] values come from our families,
communities, schools, churches, and
indeed from our religion and literature.
My own exposure to the conflicts of absolute values came initially from reading
Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment,
wherein Sofya Semyonovna Marmeladov
turns to prostitution to support her family.
My love of the environment came from
reading Yasunari Kawabata’s famous
novel, The Old Capital, which purports a
harmony between man and nature, rather
than the traditional Christian belief that
nature must serve man.”

“The economical advantages of commerce are unsurpassed in importance by
those of its effects, which are intellectual
and moral. It is hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present low state of
human improvement, of placing human
beings in contact with persons dissimilar
to themselves, and with modes of thought
and action unlike those with which they
are familiar … There is no nation which
does not need to borrow from others, not
merely particular arts or practices, but
essential points of character with which
its own type is inferior … It may be said
without exaggeration that the great extent
and rapid increase in international trade,
in being the principal guarantee of the
peace of the world, is the great permanent
security for the uninterrupted progress of
the ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race.”

How does one react then to a phenomenon like
Bernie Madoff? Does it not represent the corrosion of moral values in the marketplace? Not
quite. The payoffs from corner-cutting, indeed
outright theft, have been so huge in the financial
sector that those who are crooked are naturally
drawn to such scheming. The financial markets
did not produce Madoff’s crookedness; Madoff
was almost certainly depraved to begin with.
Then again, in contradiction of the claim that
markets undermine morality, there is also a substantial and fascinating literature, as illustrated
by the writings of the sociologist Allan Silver
(1997), which argues ingeniously that markets
enhance morality. Silver has argued that the
impersonal relations in the marketplace replaced
the personal relations of the earlier society and
polity; and that the moral quality of personal
relationships which had earlier been oriented
to calculation and interest was now enhanced
because it was now freed from practical necessity, calculation, and the anxieties of betrayal.
In this view, the oft-repeated notion that The
Theory of Moral Sentiments should be regarded
as a “corrective,” and a supplement, to The
Wealth of Nations—that “capitalism requires
morality”—is incorrect. Rather, the former
work describes the morality that Adam Smith’s
“
commercial society” of impersonal transactions brings about.

References
Bentham, Jeremy. 1776. A Fragment on Govern-

ment: Being an Examination of what is Delivered on the Subject of Government in General.
London. [Reprinted in Works, ed. J. Bowring.]
Bentham, Jeremy. 1780 (1798). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Printed in the Year 1780 and now First
Published, London 1798. Oxford: Clarendon
Press. [Reprinted in Works, ed. J. Bowring.]
Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1998. “The End of All Our
Exploring.” In A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and
Democracy, 501–06. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2007. “Economic Policy in
the Public Interest.” Daedalus, 136(4): 37–44.
Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2008. “To the Contrary.” In
Does the Free Market Corrode Moral Character? A Templeton Conversation. John Templeton Foundation Big Questions Series, Dec. 3.
http://www.templeton.org/market/.

VOL. 101 NO. 3

Markets and Morality

Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2009. “Feeble Critiques:

Capitalism’s Petty Detractors.” World Affairs,
172(2): 36–45.
Irwin, Douglas A. 1989. “Political Economy and
Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws.” Economics
and Politics, 1(1): 41–59.
Mill, John Stuart. 1848. Principles of Political
Economy with Some of Their Applications to
Social Philosophy. 7th ed. London: Longmans,
Green, Reader and Dyer, 1871.
Muller, Jerry Z. 2002. The Mind and the Market:
Capitalism in Western Thought. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.

165

Silver, Allan. 1997. “‘Two Different Sorts of Com-

merce’: Friendship and Strangership in Civil
Society.” In Public and Private in Thought and
Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy,
ed. Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kumar, 43–74.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Smith, Adam. 1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H.
Campbell and A. S. Skinner. 2 vols. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1976.

This article has been cited by:
1. Roberto Fumagalli. 2020. Buyer Beware: A Critique of Leading Virtue Ethics Defenses of Markets.
Journal of Social Philosophy 51:3, 457-482. [Crossref]
2. Miloš Krstić. 2020. Rational choice theory: Limitations and alternatives. Socioloski pregled 54:1, 40-63.
[Crossref]
3. Milan Zafirovski. 2019. Exploitation in contemporary societies: An exploratory comparative analysis.
The Social Science Journal 56:4, 565-587. [Crossref]
4. Milan Zafirovski. 2019. Always Rational Choice Theory? Lessons from Conventional Economics and
Their Relevance and Potential Benefits for Contemporary Sociologists. The American Sociologist 50:4,
509-547. [Crossref]
5. Milan Zafirovski. 2019. The dark side of capitalism–in orthodox economics?. The European Journal
of the History of Economic Thought 96, 1-52. [Crossref]
6. Jessie P. H. Poon, Jane Pollard, Yew Wah Chow. 2018. Resetting Neoliberal Values: Lawmaking
in Malaysia's Islamic Finance. Annals of the American Association of Geographers 108:5, 1442-1456.
[Crossref]
7. Bert Smit, Frans Melissen. Sustainable business models and technologies 197-223. [Crossref]
8. Milan Zafirovski. 2018. Rational Choice Theory or Pretense? The Claims, Equivalences, and
Analogies of the “Economic Approach to Human Behavior”. Sociological Spectrum 38:3, 194-222.
[Crossref]
9. Milan Zafirovski. Smith, Adam 1-6. [Crossref]
10. Tasawar Nawaz. 2017. Momentum investment strategies, corporate governance and firm performance:
an analysis of Islamic banks. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society
17:2, 192-211. [Crossref]
11. Stephen Schmidt. 2017. A proposal for more sophisticated normative principles in introductory
economics. The Journal of Economic Education 48:1, 3-14. [Crossref]
12. Milan Zafirovski. 2016. Rational Choice Theory at the Origin? Forms and Social Factors of “Irrational
Choice”. Social Epistemology 30:5-6, 728-763. [Crossref]
13. Milan Zafirovski. 2016. Toward Economic Sociology/Socio-Economics? Sociological Components
in Contemporary Economics and Implications for Sociology. The American Sociologist 47:1, 56-80.
[Crossref]
14. Stephen J. Schmidt. 2015. Examining Theories of Distributive Justice with an Asymmetric Public
Goods Game. The Journal of Economic Education 46:3, 260-273. [Crossref]
15. Zakaria Ali Aribi, Thankom Arun. 2015. Corporate Social Responsibility and Islamic Financial
Institutions (IFIs): Management Perceptions from IFIs in Bahrain. Journal of Business Ethics 129:4,
785-794. [Crossref]
16. Godson Ikiebey. 2015. A Review of Extant Literature to Build the Socio-Economic Framework
Africapitalism. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
17. Milan Zafirovski. 2014. Rational Choice Requiem: The Decline of an Economic Paradigm and its
Implications for Sociology. The American Sociologist 45:4, 432-452. [Crossref]
18. Milan Zafirovski. 2014. Sociological dimensions in classical/neoclassical economics: Conceptions of
social economics and economic sociology. Social Science Information 53:1, 76-118. [Crossref]
19. Stephen Schmidt. 2014. Teaching Normative Economics with a Classroom Experiment: An
Asymmetric Public Goods Game. SSRN Electronic Journal . [Crossref]
20. Ayman Reda. 2013. Islam and Markets. Review of Social Economy 71:1, 20-43. [Crossref]

